

**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE  
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**NATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR:  
GUIDING NATIONAL POWER TO VICTORY**

**By**

**Jonathan C. Muenchow  
Major, U.S. Army**

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**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

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**Thesis Advisor: Dr. Vardell Nesmith**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Principles of War have long served as the foundation for warfighting doctrine, the how-to checklist for waging war. The current set of principles, however, was developed by military men for military application and does not meet the intent of a guide to war for the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. Relevant Principles of War must be applicable to every element of national power and encourage unified and coordinated action across and between diplomacy, economic policy, military action, and national information. The current set of principles has endured for so long because they support the traditional American Way of War, a way of war that favors the tactical or operational military objective over the strategic. As a nation, we can no longer afford to view war as solely a military action. The changing nature of the threat and the growing number of complex contingency operations we face requires a holistic view of war that includes every component of national power (collectively referred to as DIME – Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic). National Principles of War must serve as a warfighting guide not just the military but also to the other elements of the United States national power. Using Operation Iraqi Freedom as a case study, this paper examines the deficiencies of the current Principles of War, provides a recommendation for the National Principles of War, and looks at how the National Principles of War applies to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

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## **Introduction**


Throughout the history of war, man has looked for ways to gain advantage over his adversaries in order to achieve victory. This search has led to countless evolutions in the way war is waged and how armies are equipped, organized, and trained. As warfare expanded beyond the realm of the feudal lord and his knights it became increasingly a national endeavor requiring the commitment of greater resources in the form of manpower and material. Governments were forced to develop methods and systems of conflict to handle the increasingly large size of national armies and to train soldiers in the tactics dictated by new and deadly weapons such as the musket, the rifle, and artillery. In short, as the scope of warfare grew beyond the nobility to include all elements of society, the aim of warfare correspondingly shifted from feudal whimsy to national economic, political, and military concerns.<sup>1</sup> With this increase in the scale and complexity of conflict, theorists began to search for the fundamental principles that defined war. Ultimately this search provided the Principles of War<sup>2</sup> (Mass, Objective, Speed, Surprise, Maneuver, Offensive, Unity of Command, Simplicity, and Economy of Force) which have guided doctrine and the military view of war for over 90 years. These principles, however, are overly weighted to support military operations in war and do little to guide the other elements of national power. While the Principles of War have appeared relevant to our major conventional conflicts dominated by military action, they have often been seen as incomplete or inadequate to guide the use of force in smaller wars. As we transform the United States Government and the military to meet the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, we must include the Principles of War in that process to ensure that the

principles that form the “enduring bedrock”<sup>3</sup> of our wartime doctrine provide us the flexibility to counter any threat we face now or in the future.

To be truly relevant, Principles of War must be applicable to every element of national power and must facilitate unified and coordinated action at the **strategic level** among the components of diplomacy, national information, military action, and economic policy (collectively referred to as DIME). If we as a nation hope to be successful at war, we must now sufficiently broaden our understanding of the Principles of War to allow us to attack threats “through a coordinated political, security, and economic strategy.”<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, we must update the principles using a holistic approach that supports every element of National Power. National Principles of War can provide the “enduring bedrock” for our strategic doctrine such as our National Security Strategy. Now is the time to develop and adopt National Principles of War as the foundation for our national strategies, policies, and doctrines. It is here proposed that the components of the National Principles of War are Objective, Shape, Allocate, Synchronize, Persevere, Dominate, and Adapt.

What we currently consider the Principles of War should actually be regarded as a subset of the National Principles of War, applicable at the operational and tactical levels. They remain relevant to the conduct of military operations and should not simply be thrown out. As a subset to the proposed National Principles, the current Principles of War would become Principles of Military Operations, supporting and guiding the application of the military component of national power. In fact, each element of National Power should develop its own principles; there should be Principles of Diplomatic Operations, Principles of Information Operations, Principles of Military

Operations, and Principles of Economic Operations. Each principle of operation, in turn, would provide the foundation for the operating concepts and doctrine of that element of national power at the operational and tactical levels of war (see figure 1).



**Figure 1**

Configured as above, the National Principles of War could provide a better overall framework for the conduct and synchronization of operations across the spectrum of national power.

Such a revision of the principles of war is a vital component of our efforts to transform and better meet the challenges of the future. We have already recognized that the national security of the United States can no longer be guaranteed by the military alone<sup>5</sup> and that “wars in the 21st century will increasingly require use of all elements of national power.”<sup>6</sup> A revised set of Principles of War would support this goal by facilitating the transcending of the traditional boundaries between the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic components of national power. If we are truly to transform our culture of war, we must include a reworking of the Principles of War in the process.

While the current Principles of War may not serve the nation well as a strategic guide to war, they work well as an operational and tactical guide to military operations and therefore warrant retention as Principles of Military Operations. Indeed, the over emphasis of the current Principles on the military element of National Power has already led some to label the principles as more Principles of Battle<sup>7</sup> than Principles of War. As John I. Alger remarked in his book on the history of the Principles of War, “[The principles] reflect general intellectual currents and the relationship of these currents to *military doctrine*”<sup>8</sup> (emphasis added). In other words, as theorists developed the principles of war they concentrated on capturing the essential characteristics of the employment of military power in conflict rather than on the application of national power as a whole. As a result, the Principles of War recognized today have maintained a decidedly military focus throughout the years. These current principles have been utilized for so long because the European and American ways of war from the Industrial Age to the present have predominantly been focused on the military. Since the Industrial



Age, success in war and conventional conflict has been characterized by defeating the opposing military in battle and forcing its surrender. The Principles of War have reflected that reality. However, if we examine the evolution of warfare right up to the present, we can see that we have moved beyond the traditional model of conflict. Despite this evolution, the principles of war have remained essentially unchanged from their origins in the Industrial Age. The Principles of War have become such a fixture of doctrine that their omission from military text is unacceptable to most. This can be seen in the responses to their absence from the 1976 edition of the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations; this prompted calls for subsequent editions of the manual to clearly define the principles of war. The outcry over their absence demonstrates the “strength and mystique”<sup>9</sup> many have come to associate with the principles. Gen. (Ret.) Donn A. Starry responded to these calls for a return of the principles to FM 100-5 by stating “I guess we failed when we didn’t put a list of the principles on the first page.”<sup>10</sup>

Over the last decade and a half, however, there has been a renewed focus on the relevance and acceptability of the current set of principles. In the mid-90s, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) led some theorists to argue that the current industrial age principles were inadequate for the demands of warfare in the information age. Robert Leonhard argued that the explosion of technology represented by the RMA had invalidated many of the current principles while the ones that remained valid did not adequately define “the true nature of interaction on the battlefield.”<sup>11</sup> He proposed a complete re-writing and re-structuring of the principles to more accurately reflect what he perceived to be the true nature of war.

In the last few years, writers have expanded their focus to include not just the impacts of technology on the perceived inadequacy of the principles but also on the challenges of applying the current principles to smaller wars, the kind of wars we increasingly find ourselves involved in as the sole remaining military superpower. These writers generally favor adding such principles as morale, legitimacy, flexibility, and restraint while removing or rewording current principles that do not convey the appropriate constructs for modern war. More recently, the all-encompassing “transformation” of the military started by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has prompted a re-examination of the impacts of technology and innovation on all aspects of the military. The Principles of War have not been exempt from this process. Just last year (2005), the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) sponsored an essay contest entitled *Future Warfare: Rethinking the Principles of War*. The OFT took the approach that doctrine and its underlying principles are dynamic and ever-changing and thus require military theorists and professionals alike to think “rigorously about those changes as well as the actions necessary to keep pace with them.”<sup>12</sup> The resulting essays recently published by the U.S. Naval Institute provide a myriad of possibilities for changes that could be made to the Principles of War. Unfortunately, the efforts to update the principles remain veiled by the fog of the traditional American Way of War;<sup>13</sup> namely a military-centric approach that focuses on victory in battle rather than on strategic success through the synchronized application of national power.

The increasing unease with the current principles stems from the fact that they are military principles ill-suited to serve as National Principles of War. Principles that focus solely on military execution inhibit the ability of the nation to employ all elements of its

national power in a coordinated and mutually supportive way. Despite what Sun Tzu<sup>14</sup> and Clausewitz<sup>15</sup> wrote about the political nature of war, America has continued to separate the military component of power from the diplomatic, informational, and economic ones. This separating out of the military component is starting to change as the nation realizes that all too often the strategic objective cannot be reached through military power alone. While warfare is waged primarily by the military, it is still true that war is an extension of politics<sup>16</sup>. As such, it requires the coordination of all aspects of national power to achieve the strategic objective. The newly emerging American Way of War stresses interagency cooperation and the synchronization of national power. Understanding this way of war will help lift the fog that currently surrounds the Principles of War.

The new constructs for war today are “Information Age warfare” and “the fourth generation adversary.” In other words, the focus of war is now less on conventional operations than on asymmetric operations. Because the objectives of the adversary are no longer purely military the goal is no longer to defeat the adversary’s military but rather to attain victory by convincing the enemy’s decision-makers that their goals are either too costly or are unachievable.<sup>17</sup> Our foes have learned they cannot match us militarily so their focus has shifted to areas where they can achieve, at least temporary, superiority. This means that for the foreseeable future, war will be waged by and against every element of national power.

Synchronizing National Power has become even more a necessity with the emergence of the Global War on Terror and the requirement to combat not just terrorists but ideologies. The military is designed to defeat the product of violent extremism, the

terrorists, but is ill-equipped to battle their ideologies. To achieve success, we must bring other weapons to bear--weapons in the form of diplomacy, economic policy, and information. During a recent speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on America's strategy for victory in the war on terrorism, President George W. Bush assigned the lead for combating radical and violent ideologies to the diplomatic arm of National Power when he stated "we are denying the militants future recruits by advancing democracy and hope across the broader Middle East....we are making our case through public diplomacy."<sup>18</sup> It is thus clear that the Principles of War must address the "complexities to be faced in stabilization and reconstruction operations in which war fighting, peacekeeping, humanitarian policing and training operations, among others, become intertwined."<sup>19</sup> The National Principles of War can provide that linkage.

### **Analysis**

#### **The Evolution of the Principles of War**

Early attempts to codify set principles were complicated by divergent views on warfare from the focus on the tactical vice operational to the different "ways of war" across Europe. That changed, however, with the Civil War in America and Napoleonic wars in Europe serving as the catalyst for unifying a Western Way of War, one based on massed armies and operational maneuver. As a single way of war emerged it became easier for theorists to express the ideas and concepts of warfare in ways that many could agree upon. Although some individual authors stand out as key contributors to the development of the principles, in general they all were just expressing widely held beliefs about warfare. What made them stand out as theorists of a distinctly Western Way of War was their ability to synthesize or articulate those generally held views.<sup>20</sup> The current

principles of war, in other words, are a reflection of the Western Way of War that developed around the time of Napoleon and continued through the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These principles are in effect an attempt to express the essential characteristics of warfare as viewed through one lens regarding the nature of war. While the principles in and of themselves do not guarantee victory, they are seen as essential for the teaching of warfare and the guiding of its conduct. They serve as “aide-mémoire” for planning campaigns; they guide the design and organization of forces and assist in the development of leaders, organizational visions and cultures.<sup>21</sup> A close look at the history of the principles of war leads us to see that these principles in their current form are actually better suited to be Principles of Military Operations than National Principles of War.

In his *The Quest for Victory*, John I. Alger recognizes three phases in the development of the Principles of War. These phases are the Renaissance phase (generally 1500 – 1800), the Napoleonic phase (1800 – 1918), and the Post-World War I phase. The Renaissance phase is characterized by feudal armies, a lack of operational art, and a mostly agrarian society; the Napoleonic phase is marked by the beginning of the industrial revolution, the birth of the divisional army, and the emergence of operational art; the Post-World War I phase is marked by the rapid explosion of technology, the solidification of a Western way of war, and the growing dominance of the West in “administrative, organizational, and (in governmental terms) operational skills, which in turn permitted the intelligent and advantage-gaining deployment of technology.”<sup>22</sup> From the way these phases are named, one can see a distinctly European flavor to the principles. Notable by their absence are Asian theorists who have also written about warfare, most notably Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung. Because they have not clearly played

a substantial role in the development of the American Principles of War, the study of the history of the principles has by default been predominantly European in focus.

The Renaissance phase was characterized by the attempt of military science to determine the underlying truths to the conduct of war. With the rise of scientific thinking during the Renaissance, the search for knowledge was driven by observation and experimentation. These new methods motivated scholars throughout Europe including those who sought to advance military theory. Thorough study of military history served as one laboratory for theorists who were searching for the fundamental nature of warfare.<sup>23</sup> Based on such study and assisted by lessons learned from actual participation in battle, different guides were established for the conduct of military operations. The major contribution to the Principles of War during this period was the “belief that the principles **existed** [emphasis added] within the realm of war”<sup>24</sup> although no actual enumeration of them was attempted.

The primary obstacle to quantifying principles during this period was the fact that warfare was still very much a part-time venture of the nobility; there was thus no dominant way of war that could serve to unify the different principles that existed. Although this period did mark the birth of the professional army and the transition of the military from “feudal orders to the modern national era,”<sup>25</sup> the focus of war-theory remained at the tactical level. During this period, technological developments in firearms forced militaries to rediscover the importance of drill.<sup>26</sup> The Prussian Army serves as primary example of this shift of focus; Prussian military training aimed entirely at producing “an automaton which could not make a mistake” an automaton capable of firing five rounds per minute versus the two or three of other armies.<sup>27</sup> With the focus of

war at the tactical level and the immature status of national armies, no “way of war” grew out of this initial phase. Rather nations developed ways of battle that led theorists to identify principles for the execution of tactics. That is not to say that writers and theorists of the time were not beginning to look beyond tactics and into the realm of strategy. In 1770, Comte de Guibert published *Essai general de tactique*, in which he introduced the concept of “grand tactics”.<sup>28</sup> His ideas of dispersing forces and using rapid maneuver to concentrate against the enemy before his opponent could identify the point of attack are both pre-cursors to Napoleon’s operational art and the principles of maneuver, mass, offensive, and initiative. Still, during this phase “strategy” remained mostly the art of bringing formations to battle while tactics served as the means to defeat the opponent.

The Napoleonic phase was most influential for the development of the principles of war;<sup>29</sup> out of this phase evolved what would become the western way of war for most of the twentieth century. Napoleon is widely accredited with being the first commander to utilize operational art. He saw war as not just one battle but rather as series of battles strung together to achieve a strategic objective. This Napoleonic phase of development of the principles is also characterized by the idea that the principles not only existed but that they were few in number and the most important ones capable of being expressed in simple terms.<sup>30</sup> It is clear through both his recorded conversations with Marshal Saint-Cyr and his own writings that Napoleon believed in the existence of a fixed number of principles which served as a guide for the conduct of war.<sup>31</sup> Although Napoleon never did condense all of his principles of war onto a single document, a review of his campaigns, writings, and recorded conversations does reveal many of them. J.F.C. Fuller does this in his book *The Conduct of War*, identifying Napoleon’s principles as offensive,

surprise, concentration (mass), security, and mobility (maneuver).<sup>32</sup> In his already mentioned work, John Alger discusses same those principles but adds the principle unity of command.

Not only was this a crucial time for the development of the principles of war, it also marked the growth of operational art. This led to a shift of focus from the tactical battle to the operational construct, linking a series of battles executed on a grand scale. However, like the tactical battle, the aim of operational art remained the annihilation of the opposing force. This became an increasingly expensive goal for nations, both in terms of manpower and resources. As war grew in scale, it became a truly national effort. This is typified by Napoleon's mass citizen army. As the nation committed greater effort to raising, training, and sustaining a military, the other elements of national power were necessarily drawn into the conflict as well. "Victory," however, retained its military focus, a focus reinforced in the minds of many, by Clausewitz's assertion that disarming the enemy is the goal of war<sup>33</sup> and the defeat of the enemy military is the means to that end. The Prussians, mostly through their study of Napoleon and the writings of Clausewitz, initially led this movement.<sup>34</sup> After the stunning Prussian successes in the war with France, however, many others followed suit. The equation of victory with the defeat and disarmament of an opposing state's military would become the predominant view in America as well as Europe, doing much to guide the evolution of a way of war based on the military arm of national power.

Another key characteristic of the Napoleonic phase was the belief that war was as much art as science. The growth of the concept of the art of war was significant in the way the principles would be viewed from this point forward. Seen as a science, the



Principles of War implied hard and fast rules; seen as a mix of science and art, they became more like general guides to the conduct of war. Jomini was one of the most notable theorists from this period to press the importance of “The Art of War” in considering its conduct. Alger regards Jomini’s chapter on the fundamental principle of war, and the maxims derived from it, as central to the development of the current principles.<sup>35</sup> Jomini’s work, Alger writes, was critical to establishing the belief that warfare was governed by a few, unchanging principles<sup>36</sup> which in turn allowed other theorists to move beyond the argument over the existence of the principles and instead focus their study on identifying them.

By the end of this period, there was general consensus among the Western nations (with the notable exception of Germany) that the principles of war did exist. However, despite the vast number of writings which in total proposed a multiplicity of principles for the conduct of war, from the technical to the tactical to the strategic, no one such enumeration took hold as the enduring principles of war. What did become established among Western military writers was an overwhelming focus on the military objective of defeating the opposing army at the expense of integrating the other elements of national power. Armies, meanwhile, expanded to record size,<sup>37</sup> as nations each attempted to create a deadly force capable of defeating an opponent in the “awesome clash of arms”<sup>38</sup> that characterized the new way of war. As the Principles of War continued to evolve they “pertained almost exclusively to the task of overcoming an opponent;”<sup>39</sup> they provided little in the way of guidance for the conduct of war above the operational level.

World War I created little need to change this focus; victory was achieved predominantly through the defeat of the German Army with less required of the other

elements of national power. The end of the First World War marked the solidification of a Euro-American way of war based on firepower, mass, and the absolute destruction of the enemy's armed forces.<sup>40</sup> This has been labeled 2<sup>nd</sup> generation-warfare, with victory being achieved primarily through defeat of the opposing military; the other elements of national power never really played more than a supporting role in gaining the strategic objective. The single way of war that emerged here gave theorists a "common operational picture" of how war was fought, and this in turn, led to the wide-spread belief that the principles of war could now be captured in doctrine.

Following World War I, two major concerns drove military professionals and theorists alike to identify and articulate the Principles of War. First, mass mobilizations of citizen soldiers created the need for standardization of both methods and subjects of training. Second, the rapidly changing technologies of war drove many to search for continuities.<sup>41</sup> It seemed the Principles of War could do both. The various service schools played a significant role in spreading the notion of principles since they provided "a prime opportunity for thought and reflection leading to a better understanding of war."<sup>42</sup> The service schools also favored codifying the principles of war because this approach facilitated the teaching and testing of the military arts and sciences. These were critical considerations as we entered the inter-war era where the need for mass mobilization armies persisted but where nations no longer maintained large standing militaries, instead relying on a cadre of professional soldiers to rapidly train and mobilize a fighting force if the need should arise. The principles served as "a kind of *Cliffs Notes*"<sup>43</sup> for the untrained recruit preparing him for the challenges of facing a potentially better trained opponent.

Although the codification of the principles in British and American doctrine required the efforts of a number of military professionals and theorists, the two key individuals in this endeavor were J.F.C. Fuller in England and Hjalmar Erickson in America. As early as 1916 J.F.C. Fuller codified eight of the nine current principles in an article entitled “Strategic Principles” published in the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*.<sup>44</sup> He wrote this piece in response to the publishing of the British Field Services Regulations which declared the existence of a few principles but made no attempt to clarify them. It was Fuller’s belief that if doctrine were to declare the principles few and “not very abstruse”<sup>45</sup> then it should also define them; an argument he took to the British General Staff. This article served as the basis from which both the American and British militaries would develop their principles of war. The British military produced the first official list of principles of war in 1920 when it published them in Volume II of its Field Service Regulations (FSR). As published, the principles of war were almost exactly the same as those advanced by J.F.C. Fuller in 1916.

Hjalmar Erickson, a U.S. Army War College instructor, who was the primary proponent for integrating the principles of war into U.S. military doctrine, relied heavily on Fuller’s work. Beginning in 1920, Erickson lectured students at the War College on the eight principles of war and how they should be integrated into doctrine to serve as a guide for leaders. While he did not add substantially to the list of principles, he did attempt to identify their origin. The principle of objective, Erickson claimed, had been at least “expostulated by Clausewitz” if not originated by him while Foch had identified the principle of security; World War I had clearly demonstrated the principle of cooperation.<sup>46</sup> From his position at the War College, Erickson was involved in the

development and publication of the 1921 Training Regulation 10-5 which was the first version of U.S. doctrine to attempt to list the principles of war. The list was identical to that published by the British with the exception of the addition of the principle of simplicity. Of note, the introductory paragraph describes the principles as immutable in themselves but varying in their application depending on the situation at hand; the application of the principles constitutes the true measure of military art.<sup>47</sup> From 1928 to 1949 the principles of war disappeared from doctrine but continued to be floated by service journals and service school publications. In 1949 the principles returned in the updated Field Service Regulation and have remained since with only a two year disappearance following the Vietnam War.

Despite the fact that the Principles of War have become a steadfast component of military doctrine and practice, they are absent from the doctrine and policy of other elements of national power. The value of the Principles of War to the diplomatic, informational, and economic components of power are minor. Since the Principles of War were written by the military for the military that is hardly surprising. In our current situation, however, we must raise the question: Why have such principles remained as the declared principles of war when they only support one of the four components of national power? To answer that question, we turn to a consideration of how the American Way of War has dominated our culture since even before the principles were explicitly expressed in doctrine.

### **The Traditional American Way of War and the Impact on the Principles of War**

“A nation’s way of war flows from its geography and society and reflects its comparative advantage. It represents an approach that a given state has found successful in the past. While not immutable, it tends to evolve slowly.”<sup>48</sup>

The traditional American Way of War espouses military power because that is our “comparative advantage”<sup>49</sup> and has been mostly successful since the Civil War. That way of war was well founded in operational art but left little room for strategic requirements. In the 1970s, Russell Weigley published *The American Way of War* in which he argued that we had evolved a strategy of annihilation and firepower that was disconnected from the strategic goal for which war was being waged. We applied the military to use “brute force..to take what was wanted”<sup>50</sup> while American soldiers “excluded from consideration the purposes for which a battle was being fought” that resulted in a purely military focus with “little regard to the non-military consequences.”<sup>51</sup> Antulio Echevarria echoes this sentiment in his paper “Toward an American Way of War.” In it, he argues that by creating “two separate spheres of responsibility, one for diplomacy and one for combat,”<sup>52</sup> we have in fact developed a way of battle rather than a way of war. This “way of battle” began as lessons drawn from the study of Napoleon and Moltke; achieving the wartime objective was seen as winning the battle or campaign.<sup>53</sup>

Retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni touched on the challenges created by this “American way of battle” in a speech to the U.S. Naval Institute Forum in 2005. During that speech he remarked that “we are great at dealing with the symptoms. We are great at dealing with the tactical problems-the killing and breaking. We are lousy at solving the strategic problems; having a strategic plan, understanding about regional and global security and what it takes to weld that and to shape it and to move it forward.”<sup>54</sup> MG (Ret.) Robert Scales has focused on the American proclivity towards technology and firepower as a way of war. In his book *Firepower in Limited War* he writes about the evolution of firepower as a replacement for manpower in the American military.

Focusing mostly on the American lessons in Vietnam, Scales details how the American military learned that reinforcement in unconventional warfare must come “principally from artillery, attack helicopters, and tactical air”<sup>55</sup> as maneuvering manpower reinforcements took too long to be effective in the brief but intense firefights that American soldiers faced. From the evolution of firepower as a replacement for manpower, Scales has theorized that the American way of war has further developed into one of firepower and technology. “This new American way of war was born on the premise that technology could kill the enemy faster than the enemy could find the means to offset the overwhelming advantages of information and precision strike.”<sup>56</sup> By melding technology and firepower, US ground forces could shift from their traditional role of “closing with and destroying the enemy to one of a finding-and-fixing force” designed to hold the enemy while precision firepower did the killing.

Colin Gray’s twelve characteristics of the American way of war<sup>57</sup> are a good summation of the aforementioned American ways of war:

Apolitical	Astrategic	Ahistorical	Problem-solving, optimistic
Culturally ignorant	Technologically dependant	Firepower focused	Large-scale
Profoundly regular	Impatient	Logistically excellent	Sensitive to casualties

We again see the focus on the tactical and operational ways of war in Mr. Gray’s list at the cost of the strategic requirements of the nation. This way of war is perfect for warfare dominated by a military focus as was our model until the end of the Cold War. It is a way of war that has evolved and become ingrained in our nature over the last hundred years. The current principles of war: mass, objective, surprise, security, maneuver, offensive, unity of command, simplicity, and economy of force, supported and were

supported by this view of war. Armies had to be fielded to defeat the opposing force and there remained a distinct separation in the methods for achieving victory between the military element of national power and the diplomatic, economic, and informational. While the expansion of maneuver warfare following World War II shifted the focus of effort from the enemy's fighting forces to his command and control and logistics in an effort to destroy his will to fight<sup>58</sup> war remained a military function alone. Unfortunately, this focus was on the military process of war not the national process. This military focus allowed the current principles of war to be applied to warfare with only minor adjustment. Mass was still required at the point of penetration or against the decisive point while economy of forces were required for the supporting efforts. Speed, surprise, maneuver, offensive and security were all essential to bypass the enemy's main forces and achieve the desired collapse while the complexities of command and control dictated unity of command and a clear objective. The principles espoused a conventional, military-centric view of warfare that meshed with our way of war and had proven successful against every opponent that waged the kind of war we wanted to wage.

Our way of war is gradually changing, but as the quote at the beginning of this section notes, "while not immutable [a nation's way of war] tends to evolve slowly."<sup>59</sup> During this evolution process, we must be careful to steer our efforts carefully toward a way of war that stresses unified action by national power and does not continue to favor military power. Driven by the ability of American military to strike anything, anywhere, at anytime without even placing a soldier in harms way, some have pushed to move toward a more technologically capable, but still military-centric, way of war. The stunning initial success of the U.S. in Operation Iraqi Freedom is seen by some as a

landmark for this type of warfare. This latest evolution of warfare seeks to out maneuver, out gun, and out think any opponent.

Unfortunately, our adversaries drew the same lessons and have been working since 1991 to develop ways to neutralize our technological way of war. As the 2002 National Security Strategy states, “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.”<sup>60</sup> As our way of war evolves, we must ensure that the principles that guide us in conflict give us the capability to counter all threats, conventional and/or asymmetric using any and all means of national power.

### **The Changing Face of Conflict**

“Increasing political, economic, ethnic, and religious divisions, the diffusions of power among hostile states and non-state actors, population growth and a scarcity of natural resources, and the proliferation of dangerous technologies and weaponry are dramatically increasing the range of threats to the US homeland and the nation’s global interests.”<sup>61</sup>

While the Germans were developing the framework for blitzkrieg, Mao Tse-Tung was codifying the principles of a completely different form of war. Although developed during the same time period, Mao’s ideas were so different that they would give rise to a fourth evolution of warfare.<sup>62</sup> Fourth generation war<sup>63</sup> (4GW), guerrilla war on a grand scale, attempts to avoid open battle between militaries and instead focuses on influencing the decisions of the opponent’s policy makers. A super-power military is meaningless to a practitioner of 4GW; “guerrillas and terrorists do not have to defeat their opponent militarily, they just have to avoid losing.”<sup>64</sup> Victory is achieved through the “use of all available networks to directly defeat the will of the enemy leadership. These networks will be employed to carry specific messages to our policy makers and to those who can



influence the policy makers.”<sup>65</sup> Fourth generation war is an attempt to bypass the strength of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation war, the military, in favor of attacking the other aspects of national power; elements which historically have not had direct involvement in war. As we will see, the challenges faced in fourth generation conflict cannot be overcome by a way of war based on the 3<sup>rd</sup> generation-warfare construct. 4GW requires a completely new way of war that emphasizes all elements of national power in achieving strategic objectives. American policy, as laid out in the National Security Strategy of 2002, has begun to make that shift. As we transform our government and military we must change more than our systems, we must change our culture and our paradigm of war.

Mao Tse-Tung did not invent guerrilla warfare nor is the practice of guerrilla war new. Francis Marion led a guerrilla war against the British in South Carolina during the American Revolutionary War; the Spanish waged a guerrilla war against Napoleon’s forces from 1808 to 1813 as did the Russians a few years later.<sup>66</sup> What Mao did was study and codify the process of guerrilla war waged for political purpose. Whereas the evolution of third generation war has moved us away from mass conscripted armies to smaller professional armies with minimal integration of the general populace, 4GW cannot exist without the support and participation of the people. Mao’s steps for the conduct of guerrilla war begin with “arousing and organizing the people” and unifying them with a common political objective and belief. Only after motivating the population does Mao then move to establish bases and equipping forces for the conduct of the war.<sup>67</sup> Engaging the opposing military does not, indeed cannot, begin until the population has been aroused to support the guerrillas logistically. Once the population has been sufficiently motivated, the 4GW fighter can then begin to carry out military operations.

However, a fourth generation warfare practitioner does not attempt to win by attacking his opponent's military directly; "in guerrilla warfare there is no such thing as a decisive battle."<sup>68</sup> Victory is achieved through patience and the belief that political will can defeat a superior military power. Fourth generation wars are not won overnight or in a few months but rather in years. Through energizing the population and drawing out the campaign, Mao was able to guide his forces to the eventual overthrow of the Chinese Nationalists despite U.S. economic and military aid provided to Chiang Kai-shek's government.

The Communist takeover of China was not the only fourth generation war the United States played a role in. The war in Vietnam saw both a third and fourth generation war while years later we faced a 4GW opponent in Somalia. In Vietnam the United States tried to wage a 3<sup>rd</sup> generation war against the Communist forces of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong while the Communist forces developed their own version of fourth generation warfare to counter our firepower. Arguably, the U.S. won every conventional battle it fought. Whenever American forces could draw the Viet Cong or NVA into a conventional 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> generation fight they almost always defeated them. However, while we used body counts as a metric for success, the Communists looked toward the effects they could achieve on the U.S. population and in particular the politicians. The Tet offensive is a perfect example of this. Although at the tactical and operational level, the Tet offensive was a crushing defeat for the Communists it marked the turning point in U.S. public opinion and the beginning of the end of our involvement in Vietnam. In the end, the mounting casualties and the unexpected duration of conflict against a third rate military turned public opinion against the war and the U.S. policy

makers decided to withdraw. Victory was achieved not by conventional militaries but by an enemy who used guerrilla tactics and time to defeat a vastly superior military.

Somalia began as a humanitarian aid mission to provide food and relief for thousands of starving Somalis but shifted to a fourth-generation war as the warlord Aideed became more aggressive toward United Nations soldiers and aid workers. Without an integrated strategy from the national leadership, the military objectives ended up driving the mission. As Aideed became more aggressive, the military mission focused more and more on removing him. After a lengthy gun battle which resulted in 18 U.S. fatalities and the worldwide broadcast of images of dead service members being dragged through the streets, the U.S. withdrew from Somalia. The battle of “Blackhawk Down” was akin to Tet for both sides. Although Aideed and his forces lost tactically, suffering over 1000 casualties, he won strategically as the U.S. policy makers lost the will to continue operations in Somalia and withdrew shortly thereafter. Unfortunately, because both Vietnam and Somalia “took place far from the European centers of power” the lessons learned were largely ignored.<sup>69</sup> Rather than adapt our National Strategy to cope with fourth generation conflict, we determined not to get involved in civil wars and nation building. Unfortunately for us at the time we did not realize that fourth generation war had seated itself firmly at the table.

It is interesting to note that following our loss in Vietnam, the principles of war were omitted from the next publication of FM 100-5 (Army Operations). That interruption followed our first defeat at the hands of a 4<sup>th</sup> Generation-Warfare opponent and brought the inadequacy of the principles briefly to the forefront. What prompted the doctrine writers during that period to omit the principles of war from the 1976 edition of

Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (Operations)? Gen. (Ret.) Donn A. Starry, Commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which produced the FM remarked, “It wasn’t our intent...to ignore those principles.....But instead of giving a bland, dry listing of the principles, we tried to apply them appropriately in modern terms to the battlefield.”<sup>70</sup> The challenge was that the principles of war did not support the grand strategy for war against a 4<sup>th</sup> Generation-Warfare opponent. How could our diplomats use such principles as mass,<sup>71</sup> offensive, simplicity, and maneuver to establish a strategy against an ideology and a culture we didn’t understand? We saw the results of using a military strategy of annihilation; while we were waging a conventional war aimed at destroying an opposing military, the enemy was waging a 4<sup>th</sup> generation war aimed at our policy makers. Operational and tactical successes were our benchmarks whereas strategic success was his. Today we find ourselves in much the same situation as during Vietnam; a military structured for 3<sup>rd</sup> generation warfare operating predominately in a 4<sup>th</sup> generation war environment.

Although fourth generation opponents may not have a conventional military that does not imply that 4GW is bloodless. As we saw with Vietnam, Somalia, and September 11<sup>th</sup>, a 4<sup>th</sup> Generation-Warfare opponent will use any means available to inflict casualties with the focus of his efforts aimed at American will in order to produce the desired effect. The unconventional nature of the threat makes targeting him with military assets incredibly difficult. This form of warfare is not new. What is new is that it is now the primary way war against the U.S. will be waged. Waging this type of war, it becomes increasing clear that “security is not just a military concern. The origins of most security problems are not limited to military developments, and the solutions to security

problems are rarely limited to military actions.”<sup>72</sup> Military principles of war rooted in Industrial Age concepts and focused on guiding the military to victory do not provide the guidance required at the national level to unify all aspects of national power. The principles of war worked up until now because we have fought our wars using the Industrial Age or the 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation-Warfare model. When we faced opponents who used the same model, we were successful but against opponents using the 4<sup>th</sup> Generation-Warfare model (Vietnam and Somali) the results were anything but success. In Vietnam, the war could not be won using the 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation maneuver warfare model against a guerrilla force. Although U.S. forces were militarily superior to both the conventional North Vietnamese Army and the unconventional Viet Cong, we ultimately lost because we failed to fight the war beyond the military campaign. We did not focus our national efforts against the ideology of the enemy and toward maintaining public support. The U.S. maintains a third generation warfare focus despite the fact that the vast majority of conflicts and wars we have fought since the end of the Cold War are closer to 4<sup>th</sup> generation: Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now the counterinsurgency in Iraq. For too long we maintained our focus on the European battlefield and overlooked “less popular but more relevant real-war experience in less-favorable climates.”<sup>73</sup> The “Red Horde” of the Soviet Union is no longer our principle threat, instead we are faced with smaller but more numerous challenges that require more than mass and technology to counter. The Principles of War must change to provide us the flexibility to counter the threats we face now and in the future with more than just military power.

### **Transforming to Meet the Threat of 4<sup>th</sup> Generation-War**

Throughout history the U.S. has transformed national power, predominantly in the form of the military, to meet the challenges posed by emerging threats. Upon entering the two world wars America mobilized millions of soldiers to generate massive armies that could counter technologically and doctrinally superior opponents. Following World War II, we developed our strategic bombing capability to counter Soviet conventional superiority and then developed intercontinental ballistic missiles to counter Soviet strategic bomber forces. As the Soviet ability to match our intercontinental missile forces grew we developed the doctrine of flexible deterrence which resulted in a “transformation” of the military producing special operations forces and increased conventional capability. The military doctrines of Mobile Defense and AirLand Battle combined with the growth in computer technologies gave rise to the widely acclaimed Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA was the “transformation” of the late 1980s and 1990s. As a result of this Revolution in Military Affairs and the amazing ability of the military as demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm, attention was focused on the technological results of transformation rather than its cultural effects. Major General (Ret.) Scales captured the challenge of transformation in the following statement:

“Transformation has been interpreted as exclusively technological, but against an enemy who fights unconventionally...it is more important to understand motivation, intent, method, and culture than to have a few more meters of precision, knots of speed, or bits of bandwidth.”<sup>74</sup>

This technological and organizational focus of transformation has led some to believe that the other elements of national security are in danger of becoming “irrelevant”<sup>75</sup> if they do not keep pace with the technological changes of the RMA within the military. This view misses the most important component of transformation, the

cultural changes that may lead to better integration and application of national power. Transformation is not just about technology and organization but also about culture and thought; not just the culture and thought process of the enemy but our own as well. National Principles of War play a vital role in the cultural transformation of the United States Government by inculcating the belief that victory can only be achieved through application of all elements of national power.

While the President has put his weight behind transforming the government to deal with the challenges of the current security environment,<sup>76</sup> the resulting changes have mostly been structural and technological. Transformational diplomacy has resulted in the shifting of embassies and personnel within the State Department while military transformation has led to efforts to increase the size of special operations forces, restructuring of Army brigades, creation of “naval infantry,” and the generation of a Marine Corps special operations force; these examples are but a few of the changes made in the name of transformation. Another structural change spurred on by “transformation” is the creation of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group (JIACG) which is supposed to overcome the challenges of policy deconfliction and coordination highlighted in the following quote:

“At a time when threats and problems are merging to develop deep, long-lasting challenges to national security, America clings to a ponderous and stove-piped decision making process that makes policy difficult to develop and even more difficult to implement. In short, when the Government confronts conflated or melded problems that are beyond the capacity of any single department or agency to solve, it rarely develops comprehensive policies; instead it poorly coordinates actions, badly integrates its strategies, and fails to synchronize policy implementation.”<sup>77</sup>

While many of the changes underway work toward solving the challenges we face in conflict today, they do not address the cultural and thought-process changes needed to truly “transform” our way of war to meet the threats of fourth-generation warfare. It is

the transformation of culture and thought that must drive the transformation of systems and organizations not the other way around. Under the current process of transformation, we are focusing on military systems and organizations based on the traditional American way of war which places primacy for victory with the military. This is a failed approach which at best will cost us billions of dollars as we correct transformational errors made without considering how the nation must employ all components of national power. To ensure the success of transformation, we must begin by changing our culture within each element of national power. This cultural change requires that we redefine our understanding of war and expand its scope beyond just the employment of the military in major combat operations. Figure 2<sup>78</sup> depicts a more holistic view of conflict that we should adopt if we are to organize national power to achieve victory in fourth-generation war.




Figure 2

The first thing one notices when looking at this chart is that while war or conflict begins with military operations it does not end until political victory, or the strategic objective, is



achieved. Declaring victory at the conclusion of major combat operations,<sup>79</sup> as we have been prone to do of late, leaves us far short of achieving the strategic endstate.

Maintaining a more holistic view of conflict allows us to better identify National Principles of War which serve to unify the actions of national power and better prepare us to reach conflict resolution rather than simply conflict termination. Our inability to coordinate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means has been overshadowed by our shortsighted view of war being only the domain of military action. Since our efforts to rebuild Japan and Germany following World War II we have failed to plan and execute war beyond securing an end to conflict and a redeployment of American forces. As we transform to meet the challenges of the future, we must define how we will integrate national power to achieve our strategic objectives. Defining the new American Way of War shows that it is time to stop confusing military principles of operation with principles of war and time to develop National Principles of War.

#### **Defining the New American Way of War**

“In our system of government, there is a clear connection between war, its boundaries, and peace, but one would never know this by studying the principles of war. We need to reiterate this relationship clearly and often.”<sup>80</sup>

Before proceeding further down the road of transformation, we must clearly define our understanding of conflict today and how we envision waging war. The first step in this process is defining the American way of war in this new era. By defining the new American Way of War, one that integrates National Power rather than subordinates everything to the military, we are then able to define the true National Principles of War and rename the current principles as they rightly are, Principles of Military Operations.

Webster’s defines war as: “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between political units (as states or nations).”<sup>81</sup> This definition fails to capture

the evolving threat of trans-national terrorists and regional instability caused by failed states. It presupposes that war can only be waged between established political entities in the form of states or nations; that simply is not the case anymore. This definition implies through the term “armed conflict” that war is solely the province of the military; a fact that is not supported by the nature of conflict today. The Joint Staff, in recognition of the evolving nature of the threat, offers a better definition:

“the imposition of American or allied will and the attainment of strategic objectives and outcomes through the deflation of the adversary’s will, and the defeat of the adversary’s instruments of power, capabilities, and means to fight and resist.”<sup>82</sup>

This definition encompasses the range of adversaries we face today and the requirement to attack those adversaries across the spectrum of national power. However, to further emphasize the importance of utilizing all forms of power, the definition should be rewritten as:

The imposition of American or allied will and the attainment of strategic objectives and outcomes through **the use of all elements of national power** to **reduce** the adversary’s will **to oppose American or allied efforts**, and defeat the adversary’s instruments of power, capabilities, and means to fight and resist.

The above definition of war provides a clearer understanding of the nature of conflict and the true requirements to achieve victory. With this in mind, a review of the national strategies reveals the gradual emergence of a new way of war in America that attempts to synchronize national power to achieve the national objectives. Understanding this way of war highlights the inadequacies of the current principles as a guide to war and accentuates the need for National Principles of War. Despite the overwhelming evidence that warfare as we want to fight it is no longer the primary way of war in the world, we continue to resist integrating national power. Changing our accepted definition of war to something like the one presented above could help change our mindset of what war is and bring it more in line with what we are faced with today.

The current nature of warfare is not new to the U.S., but because of distaste for it or because of our lack of success, we have ignored many of its lessons. Max Boot makes the argument that the American Way of War has been shaped in no small part by our involvement in countless small wars and it was these involvements that led to the “rise in American power” much like the rise in power of colonial England. American involvement will continue in these “savage wars of peace” through punitive actions as with Afghanistan or as we are drawn more frequently into peace operations “that hold out the promise of resolving small problems before they fester into major crises.”<sup>83</sup> The challenge with small wars is that our track record for success and carrying them out to the end has been mixed at best, particularly with punitive and pacification campaigns.<sup>84</sup>

However, based on lessons learned since the end of the Cold War, particularly lessons from ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American way of war is evolving in reaction to threats posed by the modern strategic environment. The emergence of irregular and disruptive threats has forced us to shift our paradigm away from the traditional or conventional in order to bring all elements of power to bear against these new threats. Simply throwing the military at an insurgency without clear strategic guidance and support from and synchronization with the other elements of national power is no guarantee of success. In fact, one could make a strong argument that in the war against violent idealism, the military is not the main effort but rather a supporting effort to diplomacy. Whereas in conventional war the enemy’s military and capital city are centers of gravity, counterinsurgency centers of gravity are vastly different and “focusing efforts on defeating the enemy’s military forces through traditional forms of combat is a mistake.”<sup>85</sup> In Iraq, for example, during the 3GW fight

against the conventional Iraqi military, the center of gravity was the Republican Guard and the capture of Baghdad. In the ongoing counterinsurgency battle, the centers of gravity are “the Iraqi people, the American people, and the American soldier.”<sup>86</sup> By using the other elements of National Power, one can strengthen social and economic development in high threat countries which in turn can disrupt the ability of 4GW opponents to recruit and operate.

Unfortunately, the 3GW American way of war resists this integration of national power and “tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs into strategic successes”<sup>87</sup> through establishing and integrating our goals at the national level. Ongoing operations in Iraq highlight the need for an integrated approach to winning war or ending conflict. Despite the resounding defeat of Iraq’s 2<sup>nd</sup> generation military force and a rapid regime change U.S. forces remain in Iraq battling a 4GW insurgency. The planning and execution for the 3GW phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) went exceptionally well. U.S. forces defeated an opponent close to four times their size<sup>88</sup> in a matter of weeks with minimal losses. Problems arose with the transition from conventional operations to nation building or Stability and Support Operations (SASO). The plan for this phase of OIF was rapidly drawn up and did not integrate the other components of National Power; State, Justice, Treasury, etc.<sup>89</sup> Without a clear opponent or objective for this phase of the campaign, the military was not prepared to transition to the tasks that were not required. As Gen. (Ret.) Zinni remarked, “It used to be that if you defeated the enemy’s forces in the field, what was left was just mopping up or restructuring, and the war was won on the battlefield....There is a difference between winning battles, or defeating the enemy in

battle, and winning the war.”<sup>90</sup> Security and stability of the population should have been the military objective much like it was in Post-World War II Germany where there was a “GI on every corner.” The bifurcation of the “American way of war” where the military fights the battles and campaigns and the policy makers handle the diplomacy<sup>91</sup> in and around the conflict arose to create a void that allowed the insurgency time to build and take off.

The importance and inter-relation of the DIME is clearly demonstrated in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. This document, produced by the National Security Council, links together the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means for waging war in Iraq and provides a glimpse of the evolving American way of war. Throughout the document, the importance of integrating all aspects of American power is stressed, with no single element given precedence over the others. While the military bears the brunt of the workload in terms of personnel and equipment, it only comprises two of the eight strategic pillars or objectives. Six of the eight strategic objectives fall under the realm of diplomacy, economic policy, or informational.<sup>92</sup> As President Bush stated, “America’s task in Iraq is not only to defeat an enemy, it is to give strength to a friend – a free, representative government that serves its people and fights on their behalf.”<sup>93</sup> Our national strategy requires an integrated and coordinated approach to conflict resolution yet the current principles of war do not support integration of every aspect of national power.

Based on our history and the direction our National Strategies are moving us in and using Colin Gray’s model, the new American Way of War should be:

Politically guided	Strategically focused	Culturally aware	Integrated
Scalable	Patient <sup>94</sup>	Synchronized	Flexible

A military focus will not work against a 4GW opponent who does not field a conventional army. Likewise, military warfare principles of operations can no longer substitute as the National Principles of War. The new principles of war must counter the threat networks by guiding our doctrine and strategy for the application of all elements of national power while still allowing us to maintain our dominance in conventional conflict. As we examine how America fights in this new security environment, we see that the “new American way of war” cannot be supported by the current warfare principles.

### **The National Principles of War**

“Every era develops a language for its time. As venerated words from the past are found no longer to well convey their meaning, they are replaced with a vocabulary benefiting the present. Thus, in this postindustrial 21<sup>st</sup> century, we should change the wording of the long-standing nine principles of war with the intent of better communicating their meaning to the warriors of this new age.”<sup>95</sup>

In and of themselves principles of war or principles of operations do not guarantee victory however, omission or flagrant disregard of principles does increase the friction of execution. Principles of war/operations are important in that they provide a foundation or framework from which to build doctrine and policies based on a common understanding of how the nation fights. National Principles of War provide a common understanding of the roles and the employment of National Power in war. Where the National Security Strategy provides the specifics of how the President wants to execute his Grand Strategy, the principles serve as the common thread tying together diplomatic, economic, military, and informational policies and doctrine. In the absence of a national strategy, they provide the basis from which to operate during the stages leading up to conflict, during conflict, and following hostilities as we transition out of conflict.

National Principles of War allow us to break the paradigm of war being a military-only venture and recognize that without integration and synchronization of National Power we will not achieve victory on the modern battlefield.

The National Principles of War should be Objective, Shape, Allocate, Synchronize, Persevere, Dominate, and Adapt. Although the order is not essential, it helps to sequence them this way given the current six phases of operations used by the Department of Defense in campaign planning. The six phases are shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize/secure, and transition of authority. Additionally, having the principles book-ended by Objective and Adapt is intentional as every operation or strategy starts with an objective or goal and once that objective is met we transition to a subsequent objective. The process is continuous and the situation must be routinely evaluated to determine if a transition is required.

### **Objective**

**Direct every action in war toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable endstate<sup>96</sup>**

Objective is the most important principle. Without a clearly defined and attainable endstate to work towards national power will be expended but will not move the nation any closer to achieving its goals. Objectives are not only for the military arm of national power, indeed, without national objectives military victories are often doomed to failure. In his study of the German way of war, Samuel Newland attributes the fact that despite its military prowess Germany lost both World Wars due to the lack of national objectives. Without clear and attainable objectives, “no matter how tactically or operationally proficient [a] country’s military is, successes on the battlefield will be

squandered.”<sup>97</sup> Although the German military had the “grand objective” of defeating the Allies they lacked clear strategic objectives that would better synchronize their military power with their economic and diplomatic.

Generally, the overall objective in war is the imposition of national will and the attainment of strategic objectives through deflation of the opponent’s will and defeat of his instruments of power.<sup>98</sup> Although the “grand objective” in war does not change, the strategic objectives of the nation vary depending on the situation. For example, during Desert Storm, the strategic objective of the nation was the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait whereas in Operation Iraqi Freedom it was disarmament and regime change. The two objectives imply vastly different application of national power. The objective of removing Iraqi forces from a sovereign nation meant the diplomatic arm of national power simply had to establish and maintain a coalition supported by United Nations resolutions condemning the invasion of Kuwait, whereas the objective of disarmament and regime change directed U.S. diplomacy to gain international support for a war of preemption and for the subsequent rebuilding of Iraq.

### **Shape**

#### **Isolate adversaries from sources of support and leverage other nations and institutions to set the conditions for achieving US National Objectives**

Shaping the security environment consists of isolating the current and potential threat or threats and leveraging other countries or organizations to support U.S. objectives with the goal of setting the conditions for establishing a lasting peace. Isolation focuses on limiting the influence and capability of a known and identified threat (such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War) and on “known unknown” threats (nations or trans-national groups that have the capability to threaten the United States but have not



declared any hostile intent or action). Leverage is the primarily diplomatic process of building coalitions or alliances to counter shared threats or work toward common interests. Setting the conditions for peace attempts to remove the conditions that give rise to threats rather than focus on the threat itself. Conditions that may lead to the development of a threat are instability, poverty, repressive regimes, and disconnectedness from globalization.<sup>99</sup> Setting the conditions for peace is a continuous process regardless of the presence or absence of any directed threats aimed at the United States .

Isolating the current threat is the process of denying resources (economic power), allies (military and diplomatic power), and support (informational and diplomatic power). Against a threat where there is general international support, isolation may be successful primarily through diplomatic and economic means and without significant military commitment. The containment of Iraq following Desert Storm would be an example of using isolation and leverage to shape the environment. Isolating a threat in unilateral operations or without significant coalition support may require substantial military involvement to be successful. Deterrence is a long-term shaping operation aimed at identified threats and potential adversaries; it relies predominantly on diplomatic, economic, and informational operations with the threat of military operations rather than actual commitment of forces being the key military element. The Cold War is the prime example of deterrence. Although the U.S. military was in no insignificant player in deterring Soviet aggression through presence and demonstrated capability, our efforts directed toward the Soviets relied predominantly on diplomatic, economic, and informational power to deter the Soviet Union and to eventually bring about the collapse of Communism in Europe. Setting the conditions for peace is a continuous shaping

operation to change the environment that gives rise to threats. Examples of condition setting are the Partnership for Peace exercises, social and economic aid packages, and education programs aimed at third-world and disconnected countries. Partnership for Peace empowers other militaries with “knowledge of successful strategies of democratization (and the specific role of the armed forces in the “operational art” of democratic transitions)”<sup>100</sup> while social and economic aid packages have the ability to do the same for the general population.

The desired effects of shaping operations must be considered with both short-term goals and long-term objectives in mind. The Afghan-Russian war is a prime example of shaping operations that focused on the short-term goals without consideration for the long-term strategic impact. Our immediate goal in Afghanistan was to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of a country in the Persian Gulf region from which they could control the flow of oil.<sup>101</sup> We achieved our short-term goal of forcing a Soviet withdrawal primarily through support to the Mujahideen but also through a series of diplomatic and economic actions. However, our long-term goal of establishing sovereign and stable states in the South Asia region<sup>102</sup> was ignored and Afghanistan was left “in a state of anarchy and ruin.”<sup>103</sup> Although to say the emergence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda is a direct result of this is shortsighted, it is not unreasonable to say, however, that we should have predicted the instability caused by our failure to look at the long-term shaping operations required.

The military shapes the environment through isolation and deterrence. The physical presence of the military and the threat of military action shape the environment by forcing adversaries to consider how their actions might elicit military responses from

the United States. Isolation is primarily used for short term shaping operations whereas deterrence has the ability to shape the environment over the long-term. The diplomatic and economic elements of national power predominantly shape the environment over the long term through such actions as economic and social aid or assistance, sanctions, freezing of assets, trade embargos, and establishment of global or regional alliances. Shaping may be done to facilitate the application of military power or in the absence of military power if the shaping operations achieve the national objective. Examples of shaping in the Global War on Terrorism are the use of social and economic development programs to weaken support for terrorism, limit terrorist recruiting, and to discourage local support for terrorism.<sup>104</sup> The Informational element of national power can also be used to shape the environment through the international and national media and through education programs abroad. Tony Corn identifies a potential informational shaping operation in his article “World War IV as Fourth-Generation Warfare”.

“Now that the famous 2002 UNDP Arab Development Report has revealed that the number of books translated by the whole Arab world over the past *thousand years* is equivalent to the numbers of books translated by Spain in one year, the most urgent program will have to be old-fashioned, if massive, book-in-translation program, which will contribute to shrinking of the role of religion in the public sphere.”<sup>105</sup>

His argument is that by providing books that, up until now, were unavailable in the Arab world, there is the potential to create acceptance through understanding. As Muslims have access to different ideas and philosophies, they will be less inclined to blindly follow the Salafist ideology.

### **Allocate**

**Provide capabilities and effort from all of the elements of national power to achieve national objectives; scale national objectives to resources available**

Resourcing war implies not only fiscal support but commitment of all necessary national power resources and efforts to achieve the endstate. The financial component of

the principle of resource is important and generally receives the most attention because it has easily quantifiable metrics. However, despite what the “bean counters” may believe, the financial component of resourcing is actually the easiest component of the principle of resource as it only requires Congressional authorization in the form of appropriations bills or supplementals. The hardest part of financing war is maintaining the political perseverance to fund it until national objectives are met. While it is important to keep in mind that victory is difficult to achieve on a tight budget, achieving victory by throwing money at a problem without committing the appropriate amount of effort applied in the right places and using the right elements of national power is just as difficult. This often requires significant cultural shifts to get different departments or agencies to work together to ensure synchronization, especially if it means subordinating one department to another. An example of the tension this form of resourcing creates can be seen in the challenges the U.S. faced in planning and executing Operation Enduring Freedom. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) insisted on keeping the lead role in all phases of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign rather than giving the lead to State for planning and execution of the stability and transition phases. Determining the requirements for what each element of national power must bring to the fight to achieve strategic objectives during each phase of the conflict is a vital element of resourcing. National leadership must determine how much effort will be committed from each element of power to achieve our strategic objectives and which component of power is responsible for achieving those objectives. Where objectives overlap multiple elements of national power, the national leadership must assign lead and support responsibilities between agencies and departments.

Applying effort in the right amount and in the right places is especially important in today's security environment. Most conflicts will take place in regions or countries that will require substantial humanitarian assistance or civil reconstruction projects to ensure stability following major combat operations. Our ability to build a stable, democratic, government has been the single biggest factor in achieving a successful endstate following all of our major combat and nation-building operations. History has shown that successes or failures in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance missions (Germany, Japan, Bosnia and Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan) are not directly tied to the amount of economic development and support provided but rather the effort put into democratic transformation.<sup>106</sup>

The successes in Germany and Japan demonstrate that, if sufficiently resourced with personnel and authority, the military can effect democratic transformation. Unfortunately, since then, the military has not been resourced to adequately perform that mission as the American way of war has focused on using the military to defeat military opponents without a clear vision for post-conflict actions. To quote Gen. (Ret) Zinni:

The military "is supposed to go out there and kill people and break things. And then from that, we determine how we're going to right the disorder or fix the conflict. Usually we look at the other elements of national power-the political, the economic, information, whatever-that are going to be brought to bear, much like George Marshall saw it at the end of the Second World War. That has not happened."<sup>107</sup>

The end result is that we are now in a position where the military is left doing jobs "better suited to civilian experts"<sup>108</sup> without adequate resources, in the shape of manpower and capabilities to accomplish the mission. As our way of war evolves beyond simple military conflict, we must recognize the requirement to allocate capabilities and financial resources across the spectrum of power to achieve our national objectives. Allocation may simply be an increase in capabilities for the military that changes it "into something

else beyond”<sup>109</sup> breaking and killing or a commitment to resource the other components of national power and providing those other elements the capabilities.

### **Synchronize**

#### **Coordinate and unify the actions of all elements of national power**

Synchronization of national power ensures that each element is mutually supporting one another in shaping the environment and achieving the national objectives. Samuel Newland writes that, “once a nation sets its goals, to have the best chance of achieving them, that nation should always attempt to use multiple elements of power;”<sup>110</sup> but simply using multiple elements of power is not sufficient if their actions are not coordinated and synchronized. The failure of the coalition to transition from combat operations to stability operations was due in no small part to the lack of synchronization between the diplomatic and military elements of national power. The military defeated the Iraq forces so rapidly that the other elements of national power were not prepared to move in and assist with the transition to stability operations. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was given the task of running the reconstruction phase of the operation but because they were not synchronized with the military, they were completely unprepared to take charge. As noted by MG (Ret.) Scales during testimony to the House Armed Services Committee:

“The speed of the Coalition’s military advance may have had a political downside in the war’s aftermath. The very swiftness and efficiency of the victory may have led many Iraqis to believe that they had not been defeated....In planning for future wars and their aftermath, civilian and military leaders should make greater efforts to balance the speed of postwar stabilization with the speed of military conquest.”<sup>111</sup>

Personalities aside, the diplomatic, economic, and information elements of national power were not synchronized with the military otherwise they would have been better prepared to apply their expertise to the situation.

Iraq was not the only time when the military and the other elements of national power were out of synch. In Somalia, the military was initially able to control the warlords and impose at least a level of security but there was no attempt by the diplomatic or economic elements of power to build civil or political institutions that would contribute to achieving a more lasting peace and stable environment.<sup>112</sup> Part of the challenge was that there were not clear national objectives established for the mission in Somalia but that does not excuse coordination between all agencies to ensure they are supporting one another. We also faced this problem in Afghanistan, particularly in regards to combating the resurgence of the opium trade after the Taliban was overthrown. Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard addressed the lack of national power synchronization in their article on “Institutionalizing the Interagency Process”:

“Because this issue was not clearly a defense, diplomatic, or law enforcement matter, it fell between the cracks of U.S. departments and agencies. Hence it was not addressed in the initial year of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result, despite the threat the opium industry represents to political stability in Afghanistan, production rose twenty-fold since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001 and accounts for 40 to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economic output. Yet increased instability in Afghanistan or the failure of the Hamid Karzai government would be a major setback for American foreign policy goals and national security. Nevertheless, once component parts of national security problems are parceled out, the responsible departments and agencies devise separate solutions to their assigned portions.”<sup>113</sup>

Failure to coordinate and synchronize efforts at the national level between the different elements of national power allowed a resurgence in the drug trade in Afghanistan that now accounts for the majority of the country’s economic production.

### **Persevere**

#### **Remain committed to achieving national objectives and ensuring national security**

Perseverance is two-fold; the ability to continue working toward the national objective(s) in the face of negative political and public opinion and continuity of national objectives between political administrations. Because choosing to go to war is an inherently political decision, the will to “stay the course” and see the mission

accomplished requires political leadership to maintain public support for war and the associated stability operations or have the courage and commitment to continue resourcing national power to achieve the objective despite declining support. Continuity of national objectives between administrations is achieved, first and foremost, by basing objectives on national interests so that there remains reason and need to continue working toward an objective despite a change in leadership. This is especially important for stability, support, and humanitarian assistance missions which can rapidly lose support from an incoming administration if they are not missions that are agreed to be in the best interest of the nation.

While conventional, or third-generation war, generally maintains public support, it is much more difficult to do so for asymmetric, fourth-generation warfare and stability and support operations. Conventional warfare maintains support for several reasons: it is generally over much sooner than 4GW and stability operations, the public understands it, and America does it very well. The other types of operations, asymmetric and stability, typically lose support because they are long in duration, the public does not understand them, progress is difficult to track and understand, and typically the United States does not do these types of operations as well. One only needs to look at Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq to see the speed with which American public support can reverse direction. Maintaining support for all forms of conflict and the aftermath is vitally important but especially so for asymmetric warfare and stability operations because without long-term commitment of resources, victory is very difficult to achieve. History has shown that “no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.”<sup>14</sup>



## **Dominate**

**Overwhelm the adversary across the spectrum of National Power; continuously force the enemy to react to US actions and deny him the ability to take the initiative**

Overwhelming an opponent consists of physical domination, diplomatic control, economic control, and informational superiority. Physical domination is primarily accomplished through the military and is the primary component required in order to apply the other elements of power. In a conventional conflict, like the first phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it may not be necessary for the U.S. physical presence to actually outnumber the opponent to achieve physical domination as long as the U.S. military is able to maintain an overwhelming advantage in firepower and mobility. “Although shock and awe received the most attention, rapid dominance remains the more important concept (it) combines rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority.”<sup>115</sup> During stability operations or in a counterinsurgency role, however, physical domination requires a much larger proportion of military presence than in conventional conflict. “Presence matters. Occupations are manpower-intensive. The defeated population must see their occupiers at virtually every turn. There is no such thing as occupation-lite. You must begin with a crushing weight of numbers to psychologically disarm a population shocked by failure of their national regime.”<sup>116</sup>

But overwhelming the adversary militarily is not sufficient; all other options must be removed before victory can be assured. Prior to Desert Storm, President George H. W. Bush overwhelmed Iraq diplomatically, economically, and informationally. Diplomatically, the President used the United Nations to remove all options but unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Through UN resolutions and the establishment of broad coalitions, the United States denied Iraq the ability to make any diplomatic case

for retaining Kuwait and forced them into a situation where the only political options for Saddam were to withdraw or attempt to defend the country. Economically, the United States dominated Iraq by freezing all of Iraq's assets in America and, through the UN, in most of the world. Additionally, sanctions were placed on the country that limited the ability of the military to acquire supplies and maintain their forces.

### **Adapt**

#### **Adjust national objectives and resource allocation through continuous review of the situation to identify changes in threat, environment, and national assets**

Adaptability is the ability to “respond mentally and physically to identify, induce, and exploit new patterns”<sup>117</sup> in the security environment. The ability of a nation to adapt its objectives and use of national power to handle changes in the situation is critical to success. As part of our evolving way of war, we must be able to shift resources and effort between the different elements of national power as the situation dictates. The ability to adjust resources and objectives to meet new challenges is one of the most critical pieces to achieving success in war. Just as with the military commander in the “highly interconnected, turbulent environment” who achieves success “not by how much (he) knows, but by how fast he and his organization acts, thinks, and learns,”<sup>118</sup> success at the national level hinges on how quickly national leadership is able to recognize events or situations that dictate changes to national strategy and how rapidly and effectively those changes can be implemented.

In order to identify when changes must be made, senior leaders “must continually reassess the operation to ensure that mission execution remains consistent with our overall objectives and strategy.”<sup>119</sup> Somalia provides a good example of the failure to

adapt, in this case, failure to adapt resources to support changing national objectives. President Bush initially sent U.S. forces to Somalia with the objective to “clear relief channels that could avert mass starvation”<sup>120</sup> with the intent that all U.S. forces would be out of the country within three to four months and the mission handed over to the United Nations. Under President Clinton, the national objective shifted from one of humanitarian assistance to nation-building, yet the resources to accomplish the mission were cut as U.S. forces went from 30,000 down to 16,000 as the U.S. attempted to put a UN face on the operation. Not only did the Clinton administration fail to adapt the allocation of resources to match the new national objectives, they failed to adapt and counter the threat posed by the Somali warlord Aideed as his attacks became more and more brazen. The end result of this inability to adapt to the situation was the perceived defeat of US Forces by Aideed, the deaths of 18 soldiers and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia.

While failure is an obvious indicator of the inability to adapt the means by which a nation attempts to achieve its objectives, success may also result in the need to change. As Robert Tones wrote in his article “Schlock and Blah,” “the counter-insurgent that assumes the movement is defeated after rendering a single cause invalid by adapting policy or co-opting a section of the population into the government may be surprised when the insurgency changes its cause and thus angle of attack.”<sup>121</sup> Unfortunately, success frequently blinds us to the need to adapt. This fact was clearly demonstrated in the slow transition from major combat operations to stability operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although President Bush declared an end to major combat operations on 2 May 2003, it took until July of 2003 for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to

develop a first draft of their strategic plan to rebuild the country;<sup>122</sup> clearly the other elements of national power were not synchronized with the military nor were they resourced to meet the challenges of the evolving situation. While planning for the military campaign took over a year, the post-war plan, far more complex in what it was to achieve, was effectively assembled in less than a year following the end of hostilities.<sup>123</sup> The perceived overwhelming success of the “major combat operations” phase in Iraq impaired our ability to look beyond war and adapt to the new requirements of post-conflict operations.

Critical components of the principle of adaptability are the transitions from peace to war to stability and back to peace. The transitions from conflict to stability and then to peace have historically been the most difficult for the United States. This difficulty can be attributed to our 3GW way of war that envisioned an end to conflict with the defeat of the opposing military. This 3GW way of war resulted in an “over reliance on the Armed Forces to achieve policy goals”<sup>124</sup> and a pattern of underestimating and under funding the requirements of the nonmilitary commitments.<sup>125</sup> The principle of adaptability dictates that as conflict transitions to stability operations and then to peace we recognize the change and adjust the allocation of resources and responsibilities to match the requirements. We either develop the capability to assume greater responsibility within the other elements of national power or we provide the military with the capability to handle these transitions organically.<sup>126</sup>

### **The National Principles of War and Operation Iraqi Freedom**

An examination of the use of national power during planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing operations to defeat the insurgency and establish a stable

government reveals how National Principles of War could guide our strategic planning in the future. Although still in the early stages of its evolution, the influence of new American way of war on our strategy and use of national power can be seen in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the State Department's Transformational Diplomacy efforts. These documents and processes have been derived from lessons learned primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq; lessons that have made clear the new American way of war requires more than just military might. An examination of the planning and operations in Iraq highlights how the National Principles of War could be used to guide national strategy and power toward achieving the national objectives.

### **Objective**

Prior to the start of the war, President Bush established clear objectives from which each element of national power could derive its strategy; in a nutshell, those objectives were: "Change the regime, overthrow Saddam, eliminate the threats associated with him."<sup>127</sup> Although the military aspect of the DIME bears the brunt of responsibility for overthrowing a dictator and eliminating threats, there are clear implications for the diplomatic, informational, and economic components too, especially concerning regime change. The President further clarified his objectives for regime change during the 2003 State of the Union address when he called for a "stable, secure, prosperous, peaceful, and democratic Iraq that is a fully functioning member of a community of nations."<sup>128</sup> Leading up to the initiation of hostilities, there were clearly defined objectives established by the President of the United States and the National Security Council.

Based on the established objectives of overthrowing Saddam and eliminating threats posed by Iraq, the military developed a campaign plan that led to the rapid defeat of Iraqi forces and eventual capture of Saddam and most of his subordinate leadership. The challenge was the inability to adapt strategies, allocate resources, and leverage and synchronize the efforts of national power to meet the objective of regime change. To deal with these failures, the President revised and re-issued his objectives with the publication of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq in November 2005. This document details the short, medium, and long term goals required for victory<sup>129</sup> and, once again, provides each element of national power clear goals from which to develop strategy.

### **Shape**

The isolation of Iraq was not difficult to achieve as the country was under United Nations sanctions established after the 1991 war and the U.S. had been aggressively patrolling both the northern and southern no-fly zones, also put into place following Operation Desert Storm. Each element of power was well versed in isolating Iraq from potential allies and the international community. The informational, military, and economic isolation procedures required little alteration from the time they were established in 1991. The diplomatic isolation, however, did require renewed approach and new energy. In the ten years since the sanctions had been applied, some countries had relaxed their aggressive stance on isolating Iraq and this required diplomatic pressure from the U.S. to try and reinvigorate other countries. Secretary of State Powell spent considerable effort trying to “refocus the U.N. economic sanctions on weapons control” while trying to dissuade other nations, specifically France and Russia, from lifting

sanctions.<sup>130</sup> While the U.S. diplomatic efforts at keeping Iraq isolated from the international community were successful, the ability of the American national power to leverage other nations to support war was less so.

The leverage achieved by U.S. national power against Iraqi national power was limited. But based on the overmatch of U.S. versus Iraqi military power the challenges caused by the inability to better leverage the diplomatic, informational, and economic means did not show themselves until after major combat operations were declared over. The U.S. was successful at some points with diplomatic leverage by securing overflight and basing rights in many of the Gulf States<sup>131</sup> but was unsuccessful in building a coalition as broad as Operation Desert Storm. While the absolute dominance of the U.S. military creates strategic leverage in a conventional fight, once Operation Iraqi Freedom shifted to a 4<sup>th</sup> generation insurgent conflict, while the challenges of simultaneously trying to rebuild a government and fight a 4<sup>th</sup> generation war highlighted the American failure to leverage the other components of national power.

The inability to “effectively communicate a consistent message to the international community”<sup>132</sup> and therefore gain economic, civil, and military support has hampered the rebuilding efforts in Iraq. By not using the diplomatic and informational elements of power to build a bigger coalition, the U.S. was unable to leverage international support for the rebuilding of Iraq. The cost of the war for the United States, originally sold as paying for itself with Iraqi oil profits recently crested \$200 billion with little economic assistance from other nations.

## **Allocate**

The allocation of national power toward achieving the objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom was poorly done. The lack of a clear appreciation for the requirements of waging a war against a fourth-generation opponent and the general failure to articulate the national power requirements of the new American way of war hampered the ability of the United States to allocate resources appropriately to ensure success and smooth transition of responsibilities. While some may question the allocation of military power for the conventional 3<sup>rd</sup>-generation fight the end result demonstrated that the United States committed sufficient resources to defeat the Iraqi army. However, there was a clear lack of understanding of the need to re-allocate resources following the end of major combat operations and this, arguably, led to the rise of the insurgency.

The refusal by Turkey to allow the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to move through the country and open a northern front in Iraq may account for some of the failure to allocate sufficient forces for stability/post-conflict operations but even with the 4<sup>th</sup> ID, there were not enough American and coalition resources to secure the country and facilitate reconstruction. Prior to the war, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki testified before congress that post-conflict operations would require several hundred thousand soldiers and Marines.<sup>133</sup> This was rebuffed by the administration partly under the assumption that once Saddam fell, the United States would be able to usher in Iraqi expatriots to assume leadership of the country and establish a new government.<sup>134</sup> The problem with this assumption was a poor understanding of the status of the Iraqi infrastructure after 10 years of UN sanctions<sup>135</sup> and a complete misunderstanding of the Iraqi culture.<sup>136</sup> The U.S. leadership also failed to take lessons learned from the past that



clearly demonstrated the need for a large stabilization force and rapid establishment of a “strong constabulary.”<sup>137</sup> As a result, the forces allocated were able to secure victory with a less-than-overwhelming force but could not fill the political vacuum<sup>138</sup> without additional resources from the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power.

### **Synchronize**

Synchronization between elements of national power was poor throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent efforts to stabilize the country. Despite clear objectives established by the President and National Security Council, department and agency politics limited the coordination and orchestration of national power. From the beginning, there was a lack of synchronization between the diplomatic and military elements of power with the end result being the Pentagon assuming the responsibility for transfer of power and reconstruction. Although the State Department had developed a series of policy documents referred to as “the Future of Iraq Project”<sup>139</sup> and is the national lead on international aid through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the policy papers were ignored by the Pentagon and responsibility for reconstruction was given to the newly created Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance headed by a retired military officer, Gen. Jay Garner.

Unfortunately it appears that even the Pentagon was challenged to stay synchronized with their own operations. At the declared conclusion to major combat operations, General (Ret.) Garner and ORHA were forced to remain in Kuwait until it was determined that Iraq was secure enough to begin post-conflict rebuilding. This prevented an immediate postwar transition following attacking forces<sup>140</sup> and gave the

insurgency time to build. Despite some progress toward synchronizing American efforts, overall the coordination of national power remains weak. As Senator John Warner (R, VA) remarked, “we’re not getting the other elements of our government to bring to bear to conclude this conflict and perform the mission and bring our forces back.”<sup>141</sup> Stability and support, like 4GW, requires complete integration of national power to achieve the national objectives.

### **Persevere**

“Stay the course” pretty much says it all; the President and National Security Council have made it clear that America will not leave Iraq until our National Objectives are met. Despite declining support among the American people, the President has continued to state that “we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary”<sup>142</sup> and that we will commit the resources required to reach the endstate. But perseverance goes beyond a strong information operations campaign and keeping troops in Iraq until Iraq’s own security forces can take the lead in fighting the insurgency.

There is also diplomatic and economic perseverance. Diplomatically, the U.S. has remained engaged with Iraqi leaders throughout the development of the new Iraq government; this commitment and involvement has been key to helping limit the possibility of civil war between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.<sup>143</sup> Economically we have committed millions of dollars for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts but have been challenged to see that funding turn into projects due to insurgent attacks and the inability to secure all of the reconstruction sites.

## **Dominate**

There is no question that the military dominated the Iraqi armed forces during the brief phase of major combat operations; although the Pentagon relied more on “shock and awe” than numerical dominance, the results speak for themselves. Unfortunately, our military prowess may have also set the conditions for a protracted insurgency. By relying on minimal combat forces from the Army and Marines, the U.S. and its Coalition partners were challenged to secure occupied territory as they marched toward Baghdad. As a result, the Iraqi people simply did not feel defeated; they were not overwhelmed or awed by U.S. military power and this left the door open for the insurgency. Once the insurgency started to develop, the U.S. may have been able to stop it had they had sufficient forces to secure population centers and maintain security and order. Because they could not protect the population, the Iraqis had no overwhelming reason to give their allegiance to the Coalition<sup>144</sup> which then opened the door for the insurgents.

## **Adapt**

The Pentagon, as is the nature of the military component of national power, adjusted the conventional military plan repeatedly prior to and after the commencement of major combat operations. From the development of a new Operations Plan (OPLAN) that was a radical departure from the off-the-shelf plan written in 1998<sup>145</sup> to the shifting of missions and tasks caused by the refusal of Turkey to allow the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to open a northern front in Iraq through Turkey, the military continuously adapted to meet the challenges of the conventional threat. Unfortunately, both the military and the other components of the DIME failed to adapt to the changing conditions at the conclusion of major combat operations. The result was twenty-one days of military domination

followed by stumbling and bumbling by American civilian administrators and soldiers as each attempted to figure out what to do next.<sup>146</sup> The resulting confusion at the national level gave the insurgency time to gain a foothold and grow, morphing from general criminal looting to guerrilla operations over the period of August to December 2003.<sup>147</sup>

Once the insurgency had taken hold, the military remained focused on conventional-type kinetic operations to kill insurgents rather than on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people in order to deny insurgents the popular support they needed.<sup>148</sup> This focus on killing insurgents versus stabilizing the country can be traced back to the natural distaste the military has for nation-building operations<sup>149</sup> but does not excuse the national leadership from the responsibility to identify transitions and adapt objectives, resources, and efforts. The stability and reconstruction efforts in Iraq demonstrate a failing to adapt to the situation which can be attributed to the United States' pattern of underestimating the nonmilitary challenges of foreign intervention and inflating nonmilitary goals "without committing the resources required to achieve them."<sup>150</sup> The Pentagon was successful in proving that a small ground force in conjunction with massive air power capability could conquer Iraq but at the same time failed to recognize the need to adapt force structure and missions to accomplish postwar objectives.<sup>151</sup> While the military may be capable of short-term civil administration duties, long-term success requires civil solutions provided by the other elements of national power.<sup>152</sup> The ability to identify when to transition from a military focus to a civil focus may mean the difference between a smooth reconstruction and a protracted insurgency.

Although playing the armchair quarterback is much easier than actually calling the plays, it is clear that had the President and National Security Council applied the proposed National Principles of War, they may have avoided many of the pitfalls in Iraq. Of the seven National Principles of War, the United States only applied three; objective, shape, and perseverance. By relying predominantly on the military to achieve the desired endstate, the nation did not follow the principles of allocate, synchronize, dominate, and adapt. Although the military did apply the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements at the operational level, they were not synchronized “at the strategic level as part of grand strategy.”<sup>153</sup> Applying the four components of national power in a grand strategy requires a clear understanding of the National Principles of War and their role as the basis for national strategy and policy and framework for the policy and doctrine of national power.

#### **From National Principles of War to Principles of Operation**

While the National Principles of War can serve as a guide for the application of national power in war, there also exist principles of operation for each individual component of power. Whereas the National Principles of War may be used to guide National Power at the strategic level, principles of operation would be used to capture the essential characteristics of how each element of power works within the framework of DIME to support national objectives at the operational and tactical levels. The principles of operation are derived in part from the National Principles of War and provide the foundation from which doctrine and policy is developed within each component of power. The degree to which the National Principles of War form the respective principles of operations varies based on the roles and responsibilities of each component

of power. Because the military exists primarily to fight and win the nation's wars, the Principles of Military Operations are most heavily influenced by the National Principles of War. The diplomatic, informational, and economic principles of operations are influenced by the National Principles of War but rely as heavily, if not more so, on other sources such as the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and trade agreements as these components of power play a larger role in building and maintaining stability and peace for the nation.

What we have been referring to as the Principles of War since the 1920s are, in fact, the Principles of Military Operations. The principles of Mass, Offensive, Surprise, Security, Maneuver, Objective, Unity of Command, Simplicity, and Economy of Force are the essential characteristics that guide the application of **military** power and from which military doctrine is based. As a guide to the conduct of military operations, these nine principles have demonstrated their value repeatedly throughout the evolution of warfare. The Principles of Military Operations still capture the essence of the application of military power in war and as such should remain the basis for military doctrine. However, doctrine must recognize that the Principles of Military Operations are operational and tactical in nature and derived from a strategic set of principles, the National Principles of War, which guide the nation at war.

The specific diplomatic, informational, and economic principles of operations are beyond the scope of this paper, but their role in war will be addressed. These principles of operations, like the Principles of Military Operations, should be the basis from which to develop doctrine and department/agency policy to guide actions during war. Currently, there exists no doctrine to "guide the President and his Cabinet in planning for

and conducting military interventions and post-conflict operations.”<sup>154</sup> By using the National Principles of War as a pillar from which to develop principles of operations, the national leadership can better enable unified action by each element of power. Principles of operations for the non-military elements of power provide the basis from which to develop and codify doctrine that supports a unified approach to warfare across the DIME and is based on a common understanding of how the nation wields each element of national power. These principles of operations are broader in scope than the Principles of Military Operations because their nature requires them to operate equally well in peace as in war. Whereas the military exists, primarily, to fight and win the nation’s wars, the other elements of power have just as great a role, if not greater, in preventing war or preserving peace. Their principles of operation must be broad enough to support action and guide policy development both during times of war and times of peace.

### **Conclusion**

True National Principles of War support the use of all aspects of American power; the diplomatic, the informational, the military, and the economic. The principles of Objective, Shape, Allocate, Synchronize, Persevere, Dominate, and Adapt better guide the National Power against asymmetric adversaries and trans-national threats. These principles of war are based on a holistic approach to conflict that realizes victory can only be achieved through unified action by all elements of national power. The principles of war are the foundation from which doctrine and policy is developed.

Since they were first published in 1921, the Principles of War have seen little change in format or function and they remain an integral part of our military doctrine. In fact Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, states that the Principles of War

are the “enduring bedrock of U.S. military doctrine.”<sup>155</sup> The challenge is that the fault lines of that bedrock have shifted. The codification of the principles of war was hundreds of years in the making and witnessed numerous evolutions in the weapons we used to fight and the character of war. However, what remained constant throughout their development was that the way to achieve victory was through the defeat of the opposing military. While diplomacy and economic influence played a role in conflict it was ultimately the military that decided the outcome. The current Principles of War are military principles that have little connection to the other elements of national power and they remain tied to the Industrial Age concepts of warfighting from which they were derived. We are now presented with a new geography of warfare; our opponents no longer seek to match us militarily; instead they will use other means to defeat us. We have developed a pattern where we base success on killing military “members of the opposing side.”<sup>156</sup> The American way of war has revolved around the military; for America war is and has been a military function.

What we currently consider the Principles of War (Mass, Offensive, Surprise, Security, Maneuver, Objective, Unity of Command, Simplicity, Economy of Force) are insufficient to characterize the newly emerging American Way of War. These principles focus on the application of military power at the expense of unifying national power to achieve national objectives. These Principles of Military Operations were able to masquerade as principles of war for so long because the nature of war was predominantly a conventional battle between opposing militaries; that is no longer the case today. Victory in war can no longer be achieved solely through military triumph. As we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq, war requires the integration and synchronization of all



elements of national power. Without that integration, military victory will be meaningless.

The National Principles of War cannot be an effective guide for the conduct of war unless each element of national power inculcates them through training and policy. While this paper attempted to define the National Principles of War, it is important to note that this new set of principles still resides in the realm of the military. Until we can move the discussion of principles of war beyond the Department of Defense and involve the interagency community we will never be able to adopt truly national principles. Principles of war recognized only by the military are of limited value in synchronizing the efforts of National Power to achieve the desired effect or endstate. The nature of the threat and the complexity of modern war no longer permit us to maintain the traditional boundaries between the warfighters, nation-builders, and policy makers. Success on the modern battlefield requires complete integration and cooperation between all aspects of American Power.

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<sup>1</sup> Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz, *A Short History of War: Evolution of Warfare and Weapons* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), accessed at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0000.htm> on 31 JAN 06

<sup>2</sup> Appendix A to Joint Publication 3-0 (10 SEP 01) states: "The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine." As listed the Principles of War with associated definitions are:

1. Objective – The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
2. Offensive – The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
3. Mass – The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.
4. Economy of Force – The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
5. Maneuver – The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
6. Unity of Command – The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
7. Security – The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.
8. Surprise – The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

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9. Simplicity – The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
- <sup>3</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0 (10 September 2001), A-1.
- 4 Richard B. Lovelock, “The Evolution of Peace Operations Doctrine” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 2002) 71.
- 5 Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, Elements of Defense Transformation (Washington: 2004) 7.
- 6 Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, 2002), 30, accessed at: [http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/pdf\\_files/chap3.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/pdf_files/chap3.pdf) on 21 DEC 05
- <sup>7</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria, II, *Principles of War or Principles of Battle?*. Edited by Anthony D. Mc Ivor. Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 59. Echevarria argues that the Principles of War lend themselves more to guiding military action in battle than to winning the greater conflict and meeting strategic objectives. Hence the term, Principles of Battle.
- 8 John I. Alger, *The Quest for Victory, The History of the Principles of War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 175.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid, 168-169.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid, 168.
- <sup>11</sup> Robert R. Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1998), 12.
- <sup>12</sup> Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation webpage accessed at: <http://www.oft.osd.mil/initiatives/pow/index.cfm> on 26 FEB 06.
- <sup>13</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria, II, “Toward an American Way of War”, Strategic Studies Institute (March 2004). The author argues that the “American way of war” is not really a way a war but rather a way of battle. America focuses on achieving military victories at the expense of the overall strategic objective. I will address this in greater detail in later sections. This term is taken from the title of Russell F. Weigley’s book published in 1973 and used as a reference to the general methods of fighting and views on war as gleaned from examining American warfare trends.
- <sup>14</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 39-40 & 63-64, 77-79. The first page references are to the translator’s interpretations of Sun Tzu’s view on war and a summation of Sun Tzu’s views captured in the latter references. The second listed references are from the translated text of Sun Tzu and highlight his views as to the inherent involvement of the state in war.
- <sup>15</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited by Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 119 & 120. Clausewitz writes that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means” and is not merely a political act but in fact a political instrument.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid, 119.
- 17 Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), 2.
- 18 President Bush speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 October 2005, accessed at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/> on 8 DEC 05
- 19 Sir Ian Forbes, *Future Warfare and the Principles of War*. Edited by Anthony D. Mc Ivor. Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 147.
- 20 Alger, 175.
- 21 Lieutenant Commander Moller, P. Richard, “Principles of Peacetime Readiness” *Baltic Defence Review* (No. 10, Volume 2/2003), 89, 106.
- <sup>22</sup> William Nolte, “Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs”, *Studies in Intelligence* (Vol. 48, No. 1, 2004), accessed at <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article01.html> on 13 JAN 06 on 23 SEP 05
- <sup>23</sup> Alger, 3-4.
- 24 Alger, 176.
- <sup>25</sup> Richard A. Gabriel, and Karen S. Metz, *A Short History of War: Evolution of Warfare and Weapons* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), accessed at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0000.htm> on 31 JAN 06
- 26 Martin Van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 92-93.

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- 27 Lynn Montross, *War Through the Ages* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1960), 385.
- 28 Ibid, 449.
- 29 Alger, 16.
- 30 Ibid, 176.
- 31 Ibid, 16.
- 32 J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War: 1789-1961* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961), 48-52.
- 33 Karl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1943), Translated by O.J. Matthijs Jolles, 5.
- 34 William S. Lind, John F. Schmitt, and Gary I. Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1999), 23.
- 35 Alger, 177.
- 36 Ibid, 177.
- 37 Gabriel, accessed at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0000.htm> on 31 JAN 06
- 38 Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1989), 16.
- 39 Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Principles of War or Principles of Battle", in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. Mc Ivor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 59.
- 40 Hanson, 9.
- 41 Alger, 181.
- 42 McIvor, 179.
- 43 Brian Hanley, "The Principles of War: Uses and Abuses", *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (October 2005), 47.
- 44 Alger, 232-233
- 45 Ibid, 121.
- 46 Ibid, 138.
- 47 Ibid, 139.
- 48 Thomas G. Mahnken, "The American Way of War in the Twenty-First Century", accessed at: <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/ir/strategic/mahnken/TheAmericanWay.pdf> on 20 JAN 06.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 475.
- 51 Ibid, xviii.
- 52 Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Toward an American Way of War", *Strategic Studies Institute* (March 2004), 7.
- 53 Ibid, 2.
- 54 General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, remarks at the Marine Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2005, 4 September 2003, accessed at: <http://www.mca-usniforum.org/forum03zinni.htm> on 3 JAN 06
- 55 Robert H. Scales, *Firepower in Limited War* (Novato: Presido Press, 1995), 76.
- 56 Robert H. Scales, "Checkmate by Operational Maneuver", *Armed Forces Journal* (October 2001), 40.
- 57 Colin S. Gray, "The American Way of War: Critique and Implications," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. Mc Ivor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 27.
- 58 Hammes, 31.
- 59 Thomas G. Mahnken, accessed at: <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/ir/strategic/mahnken/TheAmericanWay.pdf> on 20 JAN 06.
- 60 President Bush, "National Security Strategy", September 2002, Introduction Letter
- 61 Directorate for Operational plans and Joint Force Development, "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", 28 January 2003, 2.
- 62 Hammes, 44.
- 63 The term Fourth Generation War (4GW) was used by Col. Thomas Hammes in his book, *The Sling and the Stone*, to capture the fundamental differences between guerilla warfare and conventional warfare as fought by the United States. Hammes builds upon the concept of generations of warfare advanced by Col. William Lind, Cpt. John Schmitt, and LtCol Gary Wilson in their paper, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation". Lind's paper, written in 1989, defines the first three generations of warfare by "watershed" events which substantially changed the nature of conflict. 1<sup>st</sup> Generation Warfare, according

to Lind, was driven by the development of the smoothbore musket and the tactics of line and column; linear formations governed predominantly by drill to generate killing effect. 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Warfare grew out of the development of the rifled musket, machine gun, and indirect fire and the tactics of fire and movement. Although tactics remained linear, firepower replaced manpower as the predominant killing force. Lind quotes the French maxim “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies” to capture the essence of 2GW. This period of warfare also saw the acceptance of operational art by modern armies as the need to position forces to out maneuver the opponent took on increasing importance due to the lethality of modern weapons. Third Generation Warfare was also an evolution driven by increasing lethality of weapons but the primary driver was tactics. Lind argues that the Germans pioneered 3GW based on the need to rapidly defeat their European adversaries to avoid the material drain of a prolonged campaign; a drain they could not sustain as well as France and England. Fourth Generation Warfare, at the time of writing, was yet undefined by Lind. He saw it as “widely dispersed and largely undefined” warfare still in the early stages of evolution. In 2004, Hammes wrote his book expanding on Lind’s concept and arguing that Fourth Generation War (4GW) can now be clearly defined as warfare fought using all available networks (political, informational, military, economic) to attack the adversary. Hammes writes that Mao Tse-Tung is the principle architect of 4GW because he was the first to assemble the divergent methods of irregular warfare into a unified approach toward a strategic objective. Fourth Generation Warfare, Hammes argues, is the face of warfare for the foreseeable future and it is also the only type of war the United States has lost.

<sup>64</sup> Hoffman, Bruce, “Plan of Attack”, *The Atlantic Monthly* (July/August 2004), accessed at:

<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200407/hoffman> on 10 JAN 06

<sup>65</sup> Hammes, 208.

<sup>66</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 9-11.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>69</sup> Hammes, 44.

<sup>70</sup> Alger, 168.

<sup>71</sup> There exists a valid argument that part of the problem in Vietnam and Iraq was the failure of the diplomats to commit sufficient mass to both efforts, thus allowing enemy forces opportunity to escape destruction and continue fighting. While on the surface this may seem to add support to the Principle of Mass as a strategic principle of war, I would argue that it remains an operational principle because it applies only to the employment of military force. While sending more troops to Vietnam or Iraq would have been a political decision at the strategic level, it remains part of a larger operational employment of military force. The principle of mass provides little guidance to the other elements of National Power.

<sup>72</sup> Michael Brown, *Grave New World* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 5.

<sup>73</sup> Robert H. Scales, “Checkmate by Operational Maneuver: Warfare in the American Age: a Perspective From the Ground”, *Armed Forces Journal* (October 2001), 38.

<sup>74</sup> Robert H. Scales, “Culture-Centric Warfare”, *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, (October 2004), accessed at:

[http://web24.epnet.com/citation.asp?tb=1&\\_ug=sid+DCC1DC28%2D21FE%2D4731%2DAE42%2D890457C77E7E%40sessionmgr3+db+sm+cp+1+E935&\\_us=frn+1+hd+False+hs+False+or+Date+fh+False+ss+SO+sm+ES+sl+%2D1+dstb+ES+mh+1+ri+KAAACBUC00026230+8BF5&\\_uso=hd+False+tg%5B2+%2D+tg%5B1+%2D+tg%5B0+%2D+st%5B2+%2D+st%5B1+%2D+st%5B0+%2D+culture%2Dcentric++warfare+db%5B0+%2D+mh+op%5B2+%2D+and+op%5B1+%2D+and+op%5B0+%2D+mdb%5B0+%2D+dimh+F8B5&cf=1&fn=1&rn=2](http://web24.epnet.com/citation.asp?tb=1&_ug=sid+DCC1DC28%2D21FE%2D4731%2DAE42%2D890457C77E7E%40sessionmgr3+db+sm+cp+1+E935&_us=frn+1+hd+False+hs+False+or+Date+fh+False+ss+SO+sm+ES+sl+%2D1+dstb+ES+mh+1+ri+KAAACBUC00026230+8BF5&_uso=hd+False+tg%5B2+%2D+tg%5B1+%2D+tg%5B0+%2D+st%5B2+%2D+st%5B1+%2D+st%5B0+%2D+culture%2Dcentric++warfare+db%5B0+%2D+mh+op%5B2+%2D+and+op%5B1+%2D+and+op%5B0+%2D+mdb%5B0+%2D+dimh+F8B5&cf=1&fn=1&rn=2) on 15 SEP 05.

<sup>75</sup> William Nolte, “Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs”, *Studies in Intelligence* (Vol. 48, No. 1, 2004), accessed at <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article01.html> on 13 JAN 06 on 23 SEP 05

<sup>76</sup> President Bush, National Security Strategy, September 2002, 29.

<sup>77</sup> Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, “A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process”, *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Issue 39, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2005), 52.

<sup>78</sup> Milan Vego, “Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0”, *Campaigning* (Winter 2005), 8.

<sup>79</sup> Karl Penhaul, Suzanne Malveaux, Louise Schiavone, and Barbara Starr, “Bush Call Ends to ‘Major Combat’”, *CNN.com* (2 MAY 2003), accessed at:

<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/01/sprj.irq.main/> on 6 MAR 06.

- <sup>80</sup> Colonel (Ret.) Herbert R. Tiede, "Principles of War", *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1995), 55.
- <sup>81</sup> Webster's Third International Edition, (Springfield: Merriam-Websters, 2002) 2575.
- <sup>82</sup> Directorate for Operational plans and Joint Force Development, "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", 28 January 2003, 46.
- <sup>83</sup> Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 350.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid, 344-346.
- <sup>85</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, "How to Win in Iraq", *Foreign Affairs* (October 2005), accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html> on 10 JAN 06
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>87</sup> Echevarria, 2.
- <sup>88</sup> Brig. General. Michael G. Lee, "NIMA Puts Warfighters on the Same Map", *GeoIntelligence* (1 DEC 2003) accessed at: <http://www.geointelimag.com/geointelligence/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=78917> on 4 MAR 06.
- <sup>89</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Lacked Plan for Rebuilding Iraq, Report Says", *The Washington Times* (28 FEB 2006), accessed at: <http://ebird.afis.mil/edfiles/e20060228419828.html> on 28 FEB 06.
- <sup>90</sup> General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, remarks at the Marine Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2005, 4 September 2003, accessed at: <http://www.mca-usniforum.org/forum03zinni.htm> on 3 JAN 06
- <sup>91</sup> Echevarria, 7.
- <sup>92</sup> President Bush. "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" November 2005, 26.
- <sup>93</sup> President Bush. "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" November 2005, 14.
- <sup>94</sup> Although most would, rightly so, argue that currently our national mindset for war is anything but patient, it is a characteristic that we must inculcate into our way of war. The current administration is working towards that end by continuously reminding us that we are waging a "long war" that cannot be won in a matter of weeks or months but rather years.
- <sup>95</sup> B.L. Gravatt, letter to *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* (February 2004), 28.
- <sup>96</sup> Adapted from the definition provided by Joint Publication 3-0 (10 September 2001), A-1.
- <sup>97</sup> Samuel J. Newland, "Victories are not Enough: Limitations of the German Way of War", Strategic Studies Institute, December 2005, 4.
- <sup>98</sup> Directorate for Operational plans and Joint Force Development, "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", 28 January 2003, 46.
- <sup>99</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map", *Esquire* (March 2003), accessed at: [http://www.esquire.com/features/articles/2004/040510\\_mfe\\_barnett\\_1.html](http://www.esquire.com/features/articles/2004/040510_mfe_barnett_1.html) on 25 JAN 06.
- <sup>100</sup> Tony Corn, "World War IV As Fourth-Generation Warfare" 6 JAN 06 (4) accessed at: [http://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-1\\_4\\_06\\_TC\\_pf.html](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-1_4_06_TC_pf.html) on 25 JAN 06.
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- <sup>102</sup> President Carter, "State of the Union Address", 16 January 1981.
- <sup>103</sup> Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 21.
- <sup>104</sup> Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, *Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), x, xiii-xiv.
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- <sup>107</sup> General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, remarks at the Marine Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2005, 4 September 2003, accessed at: <http://www.mca-usniforum.org/forum03zinni.htm> on 3 JAN 06
- <sup>108</sup> Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe, "U.S. Sets New Mission for Keeping the Peace", *Wall Street Journal* (3 January 2006), A4.
- <sup>109</sup> General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, remarks at the Marine Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2005, 4 September 2003, accessed at: <http://www.mca-usniforum.org/forum03zinni.htm> on 3 JAN 06
- <sup>110</sup> Newland, 75.
- <sup>111</sup> U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Operations and Reconstruction, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 4 April, 10 July, 25 September, 2, 8, 21, and 29 October 2003.

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- <sup>113</sup> Gorman, Martin J. and Krongard, Alexander, 53.
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- <sup>124</sup> Gorman, 57.
- <sup>125</sup> Jessica Tuchman Matthews "Now for the Hard Part, From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq", *Foreign Policy & Carnegie Endowment Special Report*, 51, accessed at: [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue\\_julaug\\_2003/afterwar.pdf](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julaug_2003/afterwar.pdf) on 24 JAN 06
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- <sup>130</sup> Woodward, 15.
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### Vita

MAJ Jonathan Muenchow graduated from the University of Maine in 1995 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant through ROTC. Following the Armor Officer Basic and Scout Platoon Leaders Courses, he was assigned to 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) where he served as a Scout Platoon Leader, Troop Executive Officer, and Squadron Maintenance Officer. After attending the Armor Captain's Career Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, and M1A1 Tank Commander's Certification Course MAJ Muenchow served as the Assistant S-3 in 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 72<sup>nd</sup> Armor Regiment at Camp Casey, Korea and as Brigade Planner and Commander C Company, 52<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment in the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis, Washington. He was subsequently assigned to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California where he served as a Battle Captain in the Operations Group DTOC and as the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Trainer. He is currently a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia.